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MID-TERM MODIFICATION OF TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
The collective bargaining agreement between the employer and
the representative of his employees promotes a primary purpose of
national labor policy-that the employer and employees stabilize
their respective rights, duties and benefits for a specific period of
time, thereby furthering the efficient and orderly conduct of interstate
commerce. The degree of stability achieved by the contract and the
corresponding degree of flexibility left to the parties are determined
by statutory guidelines and specific clauses which may be included in
the collective bargaining agreement. This Note will analyze the inter-
play between the statute and available contractual "tools" and the
effect of such statutory and contractual provisions upon "mid-term
modifications"-changes in the terms and conditions of employment
during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement. 2 The statu-
tory and contractual components which will be discussed are section
i. It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and elimi-
nate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and proce-
dure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choos-
ingfor the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection. Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)
(emphasis added).
A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial self-
government. When most parties enter into a contractual relationship they do so volun-
tarily in the sense that there is no real compulsion to deal with one another, as opposed
to dealing with other parties. This is not true of the labor agreement. The choice is
generally not between entering or refusing to enter into a relationship, for that in all
probability pre-exists the negotiations. Rather it is between having the relationship
governed by an agreed-upon rule of law or leaving each and every matter subject to a
temporary resolution dependent solely upon the relative strength, at any given moment,
of the contending forces. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 580 (1960).
See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 232, 236 (1938); Jacobs Mfg. Co.,
94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1218, 1231 (1951).
THE FOLLOWING HEREINAFTER CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
ABA LABOR RELATIONS SECTION, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (1971) [hereinafter cited
as DEVELOPING LABOR LAW].
2. See generally DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 302-04, 323-24, 332-38, 340-43, 462-79; Wollett,
The Duty to Bargain Over the "Unwritten" Terms and Conditions of Employment, 36 TEXAS
L. REV. 863 (1958); Note, Restrictions on Management Rights-Union Negotiation Waiver,
30 LA. L. REV. 691 (1970); Note, Satisfying the Duty to Bargain During the Term of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement Relative to Conditions of Employment Not Covered by the
Agreement, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 263 (1963).
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8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act3 (Act) and collective bar-
gaining agreement clauses dealing with waiver of bargaining rights,
management rights, and arbitration. The structure of the analysis of
arbitration will be influenced by the National Labor Relations
Board's (Board) recent decision in Collyer Insulated Wire4 which held
that, under certain circumstances, parties would be required to utilize
arbitration procedures specified in the collective bargaining agree-
ment-rather than be permitted to resort to an unfair labor practice
proceeding before the Board. Because the Board's position will render
arbitration clauses increasingly important in mid-term modification
situations, this Note will discuss arbitration clauses and the Collyer
decision after examining the options provided by the other statutory
and contractual components.
STATUTORY REGULATION OF MID-TERM MODIFICATIONS
The initial guide for determining the legality of mid-term modifi-
cations of terms and conditions of employment5 is section 8(d) of the
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) [for convenience, this statutory section will be referred to
throughout the Note as section 8(d)]. Failure to comply with the provisions of section 8(d) will
give rise to a section 8(a)(5) or 8(b) (3) violation for failure to bargain in good faith. Section
8(a)(5) makes an employer's refusal to bargain an unfair labor practice, and section 8(b)(3) con-
stitutes the counterpart provision relating to labor organizations. Id. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3).
4. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
5. At the outset, it should be noted that section 8(d) refers only to mandatory subjects of
bargaining. Unilateral action taken with regard to permissive subjects of bargaining may be in
breach of contract, but it does not constitute a violation of the Act. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.
v. Local 1, Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, 404 U.S. 157, 185 (1971). For a catalogue of
mandatory (for example, profit sharing plans, safety rules, wages) and permissive (for example,
union label, internal union affairs) subjects of bargaining, see DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 389-
435.
6. Section 8(d) in pertinent part states:
[T]he duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall
terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or
modification-
(I) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed
termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the
event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is pro-
posed to make such termination or modification;
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a
new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after
such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously therewith notifies any State
or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or
Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that
time; and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lockout, all the
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Act, which regulates the conduct of both labor and management
when making such modifications. Relevant provisions in section 8(d)
allow modifications to be effected but only subsequent to utilization
of specified notification and bargaining procedures. 7 However, when
the contemplated modification alters terms and conditions of em-
ployment "contained in a contract," no change may be made without
the mutual consent of the contracting parties.' Thus, ostensibly the
statutory scheme governing mid-term modifications is relatively un-
terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice
is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later.
[T]he duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss
or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a
fixed period, if such modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions
can be reopened under the provisions of the contract. Any employee who engages in a
strike within the sixty-day period specified in this subsection shall lose his status as an
employee of the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of
sections [8, 9, and 10 of this Act, as amended,] but such loss of status for such employee
shall terminate if and when he is reemployed by such employer. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1970).
For convenience, when a distinction is necessary, the first portion of the statute and subsec-
tions (1)-(4) will be referred to as the "8(d) bargaining procedures," and the latter portion will
be referred to as the "8(d) mutual consent provisions."
7. See §§ 7(d)(l)-(4) set forth in note 6 supra.
8. The legislative history on the provisions of section 8(d) concerning mid-term modifica-
tion is rather scanty. The House Conference, which produced the section in its finished form,
in its report largely reiterates the wording of the mutual consent provision concerning modifica-
tions of terms "contained in a contract." It is noteworthy, especially with regard to the later
discussion of Collyer Insulated Wire, see notes 80-98 infra and accompanying text, that the
report notes the deletion from the Conference Bill of the Senate amendment which could have
been construed to require compulsory arbitration of grievance or contract interpretation dis-
putes. HousE CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1947). This omission indicated
an unwillingness to change the bargained-for agreement without mutual consent.
Senator Taft, in a summary of differences between the Senate-passed bill and the Confer-
ence Agreement, indicated the relationship between the modification procedures and the provi-
sion allowing refusal to modify:
There is clarifying language [in § 8(d)] providing that the 60 day's notice provisions
should not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification
of terms or conditions contained in a contract during the life of the contract . ...
93 CONG. REC. 6444 (1947).
In further clarification of the ambit of the mutual consent provision of section 8(d), Senator
Taft stated that the interpretation that "parties will be bound by the contract without further
opportunity for bargaining" is incorrect:
It [§ 8(d)] merely provides that either party to a contract may refuse to change its terms
or discuss such a change to take effect during the life thereof without being guilty of an
unfair labor practice. Parties may meet and discuss the meaning of their contract and
may agree to modifications on change of circumstances, but it is not mandatory that
they do so. Id. at 6860.
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complicated:9 the party desiring change must engage in good faith
bargaining pursuant to sections 8(d)(l)-(4) bargaining procedures
before making any modification, although modification is allowable
after impasse; 0 however, the "mutual consent" provision of section
8(d) permits either party to veto the proposed modification if the
change would alter a term or condition of employment "contained
in a contract."
Statutory Requirement of Mutual Consent for Bargaining and
Modification
In order to determine when section 8(d) bars bargaining or
modification without the mutual consent of the contracting parties,
it is necessary to determine the meaning which the Board and courts
attribute to "terms and conditions contained in a contract." Clearly,
where the proposed modifications directly contradict the written
terms of the agreement," unilateral action after impasse will be held
impermissible. 2 At a less obvious level, moreover, the Board has
recently held that a matter associated with-but not actually written
9. The apparent simplicity of the statutory scheme is deceptive because case law has broad-
ened the scope of section 8(d) mutual consent provisions. The cases are legion wherein parties,
acting on mid-term modifications without bargaining, evidently misconstrued the scope of
§ 8(d) modification provisions and the difficulty of avoiding them with vaguely worded contrac-
tual clauses. See. e.g., American Smelting & Ref. Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 204 (1967), enforced, 406
F.2d 552 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969); Long Lake Lumber Co., 160 N.L.R.B.
1475 (1966); Huttig Sash & Door Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1567 (1965) (an unfair labor practice was
determined, but the Board dismissed as de minimis), vacated and remanded, 380 F.2d 628 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); LeRoy Mach. Co., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964); Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy
Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964).
10. Cessna Aircraft, 172 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 68 L.R.R.M. 1471, 1472 (1968). The ability to
make a modification after impasse is rarely affirmed by the Board. However, there are many
cases in which the employer attempted unilateral action with respect to a matter not within
the mutual consent provisions of section 8(d) before bargaining, and the Board order required
him to return matters to the status quo until he accomplishes good faith bargaining and the
union either refuses to bargain or there is an impasse. See, e.g., Gravenslund Operating Co.,
168 N.L.R.B. 513, 514 (1967); American Smelting & Ref. Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 204, 212 (1967);
Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410, 1415 (1964). Compare NLRB v.
Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 40 U.S.L.W. 4499 (U.S. May 15, 1972), where the Supreme
Court held that, while successor employers may be bound to recognize incumbent unions, they
are not bound to observe the substantive terms of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated
by their predecessors but not voluntarily assumed by them.
11. See Standard Oil Co. (Ohio), 174 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 70 L.R.R.M. 1115 (1968).
12. Id., 70 L.R.R.M. at 1116; Firestone Synthetic Rubber & Latex Co., 173 N.L.R.B.
1174, 1175-76 (1968) (the trial examiner stated that the employer could under ordinary circum-
stances refuse to bargain over matters raised by the union since the items were contained in
the contract, but that since the contract had expired, bargaining was required; while the Board
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into-the contract was within the mutual consent provision of section
8(d). 3 Consequently, any change which directly affects a term of the
contract, either by contradicting it or by adding new terms which
alter its effect, will apparently be within the provision of section 8(d)
requiring mutual consent for the niid-term modification. 4
While neither the Board nor the courts have displayed an inclina-
tion to further expand the meaning of "terms and conditions con-
tained in a contract,"'" the mutual consent provision has been an
effective weapon for combating unilateral changes. For example, it
has been held that, where a collective bargaining agreement fails to
incorporate a particular clause, any benefits accruing to either party
from omission of the clause are "frozen" as a term or condition of
employment for the contract's duration, absent alteration by mutual
consent of the contracting parties; 6 consequently, unilateral modifi-
cations altering "frozen" benefits are violative of section 8(d), regard-
less of the merit of the changes. 7
It should be noted that, although a refusal to bargain on the part
of the non-modifying party is justified where the proposed change
otherwise agreed with the trial examiner, it found the contract had not expired). See Proctor
Mfg. Corp., 131 N.L.R.B. 1166, 1170(1961) (one party cannot compel the other to renegotiate
existing terms of a contract).
13. C & S Indus., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966). In that case the Board determined that, even
had the employer bargained in good faith to the point of impasse before instituting an incentive
program, a modification of the terms "contained in a contract" would result inasmuch as
incentives were "unseparably bound up" with the wages which had been specified in the con-
tract. Id. at 459.
14. Whatever distinction there may be between the bargaining duty in matters not con-
tained in a contract and matter denominated "unwritten terms of a contract," see Long Lake
Lumber Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1475, 1479 (1966), an unwritten term of a contract is not so
"contained in a contract" as to be within the section 8(d) mutual consent provision. In Long
Lake, while finding that the long-standing Monday-Friday work week for maintenance men
was an unwritten term of the contract, the Board merely noted the employer's duty to bargain
over any change, indicating that the matter was not "frozen in" by the mutual consent provi-
sion. See also American Smelting & Ref. Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 204 (1967).
15. It has been indicated that recently "the Board seems to have given increased attention
to contract interpretation under section 8(d) and to limiting the freedom to engage in unilateral
changes of operation, even after bargaining." DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 476. However, a care-
ful reading of the cases cited to support this statement indicates that, while the Board may be
making more use of the mutual consent provision of section 8(d), it is not expanding the scope
of its coverage.
16. NLRB v. Scam Inst. Corp., 394 F.2d 884 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 980 (1968).
In that case, the court held that section 8(d) precluded the employer from placing a "non-
duplicating" clause in the employees' health insurance policy after impasse. A
"nonduplicating" clause prevents the policy in which it is placed from being utilized to dupli-
cate payments made to the beneficiary pursuant to insurance coverage.
17. 394 F.2d at 887.
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affects a term or condition contained in the collective bargaining
agreement, an assumption evidently exists that bargaining over a
matter contained in a contract is never foreclosed until the party who
can refuse to bargain over or allow a modification actually exercises
that prerogative. 8 In any event, unilateral action by the modifying
party constitutes a violation of the duty to bargain in contravention
of either section 8(a)(5) or 8(b)(3), anc the remedy for such a viola-
tion is a bargaining order.
Thus, absent contractual provisions which may modify these stat-
utory duties, mutual consent to mid-term modifications will be re-
quired when the modification affects an explicit, written term con-
tained in the contract or pertains to a matter "inseparably bound up"
with such a term. However, contractual tools may be utilized to alter
otherwise binding statutory requirements and thereby permit imple-
mentation of mid-term changes without obtaining the other party's
consent.
CONTRACTUAL MODIFICATIONS OF STATUTORY DUTIES
Two frequently used contractual tools, utilized to modify the sta-
tutory requirements imposed by section 8(d), are waiver and manage-
ment rights clauses. A third contractual device-the arbitration
clause-has achieved a degree of importance warranting a more ex-
tended treatment. Accordingly, arbitration clauses will be examined
separately after the discussion of waiver and management rights
clauses.
Waiver Clauses
Unless a proposed modification affects existing contractual provi-
sions, thereby triggering the operation of section 8(d) mutual consent
provisions, a party may raise for bargaining any matter concerning
terms and conditions of employment and, to the extent the party has
18. Cf. Wisconsin So. Gas Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 480, 484-85 (1968); Unit Drop Forge, Div.,
Eaton Yale & Towne, 171 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 68 L.R.R.M. 1129, 1132 (1968), modified, 412
F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1969); Century Papers, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 358, 362-63 (1965); Huttig Sash
& Door Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 811, 817-18 (1965), enforced, 377 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1967). This
tendency of the Board was most evident in Scam Inst. Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. 284 (1967),
enforced, 394 F.2d 884 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 980 (1968), wherein the Board, while
stating that the employer was not at liberty to change or withdraw coverage because the
contractual terms covered the matter, was more concerned with the employer's failure to follow
the bargaining procedures of section 8(d). Id. at 288. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, on the other hand, noted only that the matter was "frozen" as a condition of employ-
ment without mutual consent. 394 F.2d at 887.
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control over the matter, 19 may effect changes after a bargaining
impasse has been reached. 21 In light of this ability, each party may
desire the other to waive his right to raise the issue of-or object
to-the initiation of mid-term modifications. A primary contractual
tool for implementing this goal is a waiver or "zipper" clause incor-
porated into the collective bargaining agreement.
In an important interpretive decision concerning section 8(d), the
Board expressly sanctioned in principle the use of waiver clauses for
the limited purpose of foreclosing mid-term bargaining over matters
not covered in the collective bargaining agreement. 21 The Board
noted:
[1]f the parties originally desire to avoid later discussion with respect to mat-
ters not specifically covered in the terms of an executed contract, they need
only so specify in the terms of the contract itself.2
While waiver clauses were already incorporated in collective bargain-
ing agreements at the time of the decision, the Board's clear approval
of their use, albeit only in principle, caused widespread inclusion of
such clauses as "boilerplate" in bargaining agreements.2
In its broadest form, 2  a "zipper" clause expresses each party's
19. See note 41 infra and accompanying text.
20. See cases cited at note 10 supra.
21. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1220 (1951). In Jacobs, the Board required an
employer to comply with the union's mid-term request to bargain on a pension plan not
previously discussed in contract negotiations. Since the subject of pensions was not contained
in the contract, it did not fall within the mutual consent provisions of section 8(d), and the
employer could not lawfully refuse to bargain.
22. Id.
23. 36 BNA COLL. BARG. NEG. & CONT. 421-22 (1969).
24. See the first example of a waiver clause set forth below. Waiver clauses normally deal
with three types of subjects: matters contained in the contract; matters not in the contract but
discussed at negotiations; and matters not contemplated by either party at the time of negotia-
tion. Three examples which show different means of dealing with these variables follow:
The company and the union, for the life of this agreement, each voluntarily and
unqualifiedly waives the rights, and each agrees that the other shall not be obligated, to
bargain collectively with respect to any subject or matter referred to , or covered in this
agreement, or with respect to any subject or matter not specifically referred to or covered
in this agreement even. though such subject or matter may not have been within the
contemplation of either or both of the parties at the time they negotiated and signed
this agreement. Unit Drop Forge, Div., Eaton Yale & Towne, 171 N.L.R.B. No. 73,
68 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1969).
In the Unit Drop Forge litigation over this waiver clause, the employer claimed the right to
make unilateral changes as to operations modifications over which a management rights clause
gave him exclusive control. However, the change also affected incentive pay, a matter on which
agreement was required before modification. The Board held that a broad zipper clause does
not waive the union's right to bargain, but that the topic over which unilateral control is sought
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agreement to waive his right-and the duty of the other party2 -to
bargain with regard to matters included in or omitted from the
must be specifically delineated. Id. at 1131. For a similar result with the same waiver clause
see Rockwell-Standard Corp., Trans. & Axle Div., Forge Div., 166 N.L.R.B. 124 (1967),
enforced, 410 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1969).
[F]or the life of this Agreement each voluntarily and unqualifiedly waives the right,
and each agrees that the other shall not be obligated, to bargain collectively with respect
to any subject or matter referred to or covered by this agreement, or with respect to
any subjects or matters not specifically referred to or covered by this Agreement which
were discussed during the negotiation of this Agreement. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
Bettis Atomic Power Lab., 153 N.L.R.B. 443, 445 (1965).
In the Westinghouse litigation, the Board found no unlawful refusal to bargain in the em-
ployer's unilateral subcontracting because of the lack of harm to the unit employees by the
action. Id. at 447-48. Bargaining history showed that the parties had discussed the matter of
subcontracting and that the employer had informally agreed to discuss subcontracting on a
"case by case" basis. The trial examiner's opinion, which is not contradicted by the Board on
this point, indicates that if there had not been the renewed interest shown in the informal
agreement, the waiver clause would have waived the union's right to bargain on this matter
since it was specifically within the matters waived by the clause. Id. at 456.
The parties acknowledge that during negotiations which resulted in this Agreement, each
had the unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals with respect
to any subject or matter of collective bargaining, and that the understanding and agree-
ments arrived at by the parties after the exercise of that right and opportunity are set
forth in this Agreement. Therefore, the Employer and the Union, for the life of this
Agreement, each voluntarily and unqualifiedly waives the right and each agree that the
other shall not be obligated to bargain collectively with respect to any subject matter
not specifically referred to or covered in this Agreement, even though such subjects or
matters may not have been within the knowledge or contemplation of either or both of
the parties at the time they negotiated or signed this Agreement. C & C Plywood, 148
N.L.R.B. 414, 422 (1964), enforcement denied, 351 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 385
U.S. 421 (1967).
In C & C Plywood, the employer, under authority of a clause reserving to the employer the
right to make "premium pay," unilaterally instituted "premium pay" for certain employees
based on production levels. The union contended that the pay change was incentive rather than
premium pay and that the employer had a duty to bargain. Over the employer's contention
that the dispute was merely a matter for contract interpretation and arbitration, the Board held,
without discussing the effect of the waiver clause, that the employer had a duty to bargain. Id.
at 417.
Review of these and other cases dealing with waiver clauses indicates that the literal mean-
ing of their content is given limited weight by the Board.
25. In waiving both the right and obligation to bargain, the parties seemingly shed them-
selves of their statutory rights and return to a "state of nature" wherein the employer may act
unilaterally. The Board and courts, while allowing contractual waiver of statutory rights, Ador
Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1658 (1965), have been extremely reluctant to do so. See notes 26-31 infra
and accompanying text. For the reverse type of approach, where the parties seemingly create
bargaining duties beyond those required by the statute, see Federal Compress & Warehouse
Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 664 (1967), where the contract provided:
This agreement constitutes the sole and entire agreement between the parties . . ..
During the terms of this agreement no change or modification shall be binding upon
either of the parties hereto unless this same shall be reduced to writing and signed by
both parties hereto. Id. at 671.
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collective bargaining agreement, regardless of whether unspecified
matters were previously contemplated by the parties. Since a "zip-
per" clause ostensibly waives the union's right to enforce the em-
ployer's duty to bargain, this contractual device would appear to
authorize unilateral action by the employer without consultation with
the union. However, generally-worded "zipper" clauses do not oper-
ate to terminate the union's right to bargain in response to a proposed
mid-term modification 21 since, to constitute a waiver of the right to
require the employer's use of section 8(d) bargaining procedures,
"clear and unmistakable" contractual language relinquishing bar-
gaining rights as to the specific matter raised must be present. 7
Despite the inability of "boilerplate" waiver clauses to give the
employer unfettered control over a matter and the necessity of using
specific management rights clauses to achieve that purpose,28 waiver
clauses are presumably effective to preclude a party from raising new
issues or demands during the term of the contract. 9 In addition, the
union's right to raise a matter not covered by the collective agreement
during the contract's term may be deemed to be waived by bargaining
history which demonstrates that the union made, but later dropped,
demands during the contract negotiations.?' It should be noted, how-
ever, that such conduct is not a waiver of the right to bargain on a
matter raised by the other party, unless it is clearly demonstrated that
the union's interest in the matter was "consciously and clearly"
waived during the contract negotiations. 31
26. A myriad of cases exists wherein the employer has taken action unilaterally under the
mistaken notion that the literal meaning of the waiver and management rights clauses served
to waive the union's right to bargain. See, e.g., Rockwell-Standard Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. 124
(1967); Crescent Bed Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 296 (1966); C & C Plywood Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 414
(1964); LeRoy Mach. Co., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964); Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 85
N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949).
27. Three cases illustrate instances wherein an express waiver has been found. Huttig Sash
& Door Co., Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1567, 1576 (1965) (waiver by express provision of the manage-
ment rights clause); General Motors Corp., Buick-Oldsmobile-Pontiac Assembly Div., 149
N.L.R.B. 396, 400 (1964); LeRoy Mach. Co., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431, 1432 (1964) (waiver
by management rights clause held sufficient as to one action by management but insufficient
to permit other disputed action)..
In other cases, the waiver has been determined to be too vague. See, e.g., Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 751 (6th Cir.), ceri. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964); Smith
Cabinet Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506, 1508 n.2 (1964); Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co.,
147 N.L.R.B. 1410, 1412 (1964).
28. See notes 36-41 infra and accompanying text.
29. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1220 (1951). See also New York Mirror, 151
N.L.R.B. 834, 840 (1965).
30. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1228 (1951).
31. See note 37 infra and accompanying text.
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If a broad "zipper" clause or the parties' bargaining history serves
to waive the union's right to raise new matters during the term of the
collective agreement, it would seem logical that the commonly-used
mutual waiver clause would similarly terminate management's right
to raise a matter for mid-term bargaining and modification. In au-
thorizing waiver clauses to preclude mid-term bargaining, in one case
the Board found no distinction between management and labor." If
no distinction can be discerned, both parties would, in effect, be
precluded from effecting any changes without mutual consent inas-
much as a "zipper" clause clearly does not operate to allow unilateral
action by management. However, perhaps because there is some rec-
ognition of an inherent management right to initiate what it deems
to be necessary changes,'- the mutual waiver "zipper" clause has
not been construed to prevent management from requesting bargain-
ing concerning a mid-term modification. For instance, in Unit Drop
Forge34 the Board's order that the employer utilize section 8(d)
bargaining procedures and bargain to agreement or impasse before
instituting unilateral changes indicates that the broad mutual waiver
clause contained in the collective agreement did not preclude the
employer, as it would the union, from demanding mid-term changes
with respect to matters not contained in the contract.
In brief, "zipper" clauses serve a critical, albeit limited, role in
relieving a party's statutory obligations. Although a generally-
worded waiver clause will not be deemed to permit unilateral modifi-
cation without prior bargaining, this contractual tool does operate to
preclude raising new matters for bargaining during the existence of
the collective agreement, thereby promoting the purpose of achieving
contractual stability between the parties. Effecting the purpose of
providing the employer ample flexibility to take unilateral action
without consulting the employee's representative requires utilization
of other contractual techniques or demonstration of a functional
equivalent of such authorization by the representative's conduct dur-
ing contractual negotiations.
32. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1228 (1951).
33. While the "residual rights" theory, which claims that the management retains all pow-
ers not specifically given away in the contract, has been discredited in the interpretation of the
national labor policy, see Cox & Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term
of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1097, 1116-20 (1950), it still retains some vitality
among arbitrators. See, e.g., Owens-Illinois Inc., 70-2 CCH LAB. ARa. AWARDS 8606 (1970)
(Stouffer, Arbitrator); C.G. Bretting Mfg. Co., 70-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 8167 (1969)
(Solomon, Arbitrator); Cook & Brown Lime Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 597 (1968) (Rice, Arbitrator),
34. 171 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 68 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1968).
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Management Rights Clauses
It appears from those cases in which a full waiver of bargaining
rights as to a particular subject has been found that the management
rights clause3-by which the employer expressly claims unilateral
control over specific items-is a more effective contractual tool for
eliminating the employer's duty to consult with the union. For
instance, in LeRoy Machine Co., Inc.3 1 the collective bargaining
agreement contained a broad management rights clause 37 which in-
cluded the specific right to determine qualifications for employment.
Although management's refusal to bargain over wage rates for new
35. The following clause was held to waive bargaining rights as to a dispute over the right
to shut down a line of products:
The management of the Company's plant and the direction of its working forces, includ-
ing the right to establish new jobs, abolish or change existing jobs, increase or decrease
the number of jobs, change materials, processes, products, equipment and operations
shall be vested exclusively in the Company . . . . Subject to the provisions of this
agreement, the Company shall have the right to. . . lay off employees because of lack
of work or other legitimate reasons . . . Ador Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1658, 1659-60
(1965).
Some commentators have assumed that "boilerplate" management rights clauses will not serve
to waive bargaining rights over specific matters. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 334. However,
on a closer reading of the cases cited for this point in DEVELOPING LABOR LAW one is not
convinced of this purported trend. In Proctor Mfg. Corp., 131 N.L.R.B. 1166, 1168 (1961),
the ineffective management rights clause was so broad that no standard of specificity may be
developed from the decision. In Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949), the
management rights clause dealt specifically with waiver of bargaining rights with respect to
retirement plans then in existence. That the employer was required to bargain mid-term on a
newly proposed plan is not surprising since failure to include specific matters when otherwise
being specific indicates an intent to exclude. Further, in Huttig Sash & Door Co., 154 N.L.R.B.
1567 (1965), the Board approved a trial examiner's decision holding that a lengthy management
rights clause which did not specifically include the right to determine unilaterally wage rates
of new jobs nonetheless covered the change, since the union could have specifically excluded
that management right had it so desired. Id. at 1576.
For a problem-oriented consideration of management rights clauses, see Note, Restriction
on Management Rights- Union Negotiation Waiver, supra note 2.
36. 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964).
37. The Company retains the sole right to manage its business and direct the work-
ing force, including the rights to decide the number and location of plants . . . to
determine whether and to what extent the work required in its business shall be per-
formed by employees covered by this agreement; . . . including the sole right to disci-
pline, suspend and discharge employees for cause; to hire, lay off, assign, transfer,
promote and determine the qualifications of employees;. . . subject only to such regula-
tions governing these rights as are expressly provided in the Agreement.
The above rights of management are not all inclusive, but indicate the type of matters
or rights which belong to and are inherent to management. Any of the rights, powers,
and authority the Company had prior to entering this collective bargaining are retained
by the Company, except as expressly and specifically abridged, delegated, granted, or
modified by this Agreement. Id. at 1436 n.5 (emphasis added).
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jobs was determined to be an unfair labor practice due to the absence
of a waiver of bargaining rights, 38 the employer's unilateral institu-
tion of, and refusal to bargain over, a physical examination require-
ment for current employees was viewed as proper since the manage-
ment rights clause expressly gave the employer unilateral control over
the matter.3
In addition to the operation of a management rights clause, the
right to bargain over specific matters may be deemed to be waived
by reference to bargaining history. The standard utilized in determin-
ing whether, by its conduct during collective bargaining, the union
waived its right to bargain is, however, quite stringent. It must be
demonstrated that, after conscious exploration of the subject matter
during negotiations, the union "consciously yielded [its] . . .interest
to be notified."40
In summary, absent contractual clauses establishing grievance
and arbitration procedures, mid-term modifications are subject to
relatively well-defined guidelines. First, if the modification either af-
fects or is "inseparably bound up" with a term or condition of em-
ployment contained in the contract, mutual consent of the parties is
required before bargaining or modification may proceed. If mutual
consent is not required, either party may make a modification (the
union only to the extent not pre-empted by the employer's inherent
right to manage the enterprise4") after bargaining and notification
procedures provided by section 8(d)(1)-(4) have been properly utilized
and an impasse has been reached. The employer enjoys the right to
unilaterally modify terms and conditions of employment only if bar-
gaining rights with respect to the particular matter raised have been
clearly and unmistakably waived by the union in the collective agree-
ment by means of a management rights clause or by bargaining
history. Finally, the union may be precluded from demanding a mid-
term modification if it has waived its right to "demand" bargaining
through a "zipper" clause or by raising and abandoning the issue at
the bargaining table.
38. Id. at 1431.
39. Id. at 1432. The trial examiner's decision was overruled on the same matter. Id. at 1438.
40. New York Mirror, 151 N.L.R.B. 834, 840-41 (1965). See also Press Co., 121 N.L.R.B.
976, 978 (1958).
41. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Blades Mfg. Corp., 344 F.2d 998, 1004-05 (8th Cir. 1965);
N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 496 (8th Cir. 1946); Raleigh Water
Heater Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 76, 80 (1962); Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 337-38
(1950). See also UAW v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
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CONTRACTUAL MODIFICATIONS OF STATUTORY DUTIES:
ARBITRATION CLAUSES
In considering the parameters of permissible action in mid-term
modifications, it has been assumed thus far that it is a realistic possi-
bility for the employer or the union to initiate mid-term action after
impasse. However, neither party will ordinarily desire to risk disrupt-
ing industrial relations by instituting a modification totally unaccept-
able to the other party while a collective bargaining agreement is in
existence. 2 Nonetheless, absent a system of industrial dispute resolu-
tion, the possibility exists of bargaining to impasse followed by a
unilateral modification of the collective agreement.
Perhaps the greatest deterrent to reaching an impasse over mid-
term modifications is the inclusion in the collective agreement of
clauses which the arbitrator may be called upon to decide. 3 Ques-
tions which the parties may wish to have resolved include whether the
subject matter of the modification is "arbitrable;"" the manner in
which, at the time the collective agreement was executed, the parties
intended that their rights and duties be arranged with respect to the
matter sought to be modified; and whether the arbitrator enjoys
power to institute necessary changes.
The breadth of the arbitration clause will also determine the
threshold issue of arbitrability, but "the desirability of arbitration
over alternative methods of settling unresolved grievances require[s]
the courts to decide the more usual kinds of substantive arbitrability
in favor of arbitration . . . . 5 When enforcement of an arbitration
clause is sought in court, it may not be denied unless "it may be said
with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible
42. Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1490-91 (1959). See
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960); Collyer
Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1937 (1971).
43. See generally Cushman, Arbitration and the Duty to Bargain, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 612
(1967); Wollett, The Duty to Bargain Over the Unwritten Terms and Conditions of Employ-
ment, supra note 2; Note, Satisfying the Duty to Bargain During the Term of a Contract, supra
note 2. See also DEVELOPING LABOR LAW ch. 18; Cox, supra note 42.
44. For a pre-1960 (see note 45 infra) discussion which is still helpful on the difference
between the court's decision on "arbitrability" and the arbitrator's decision on "jurisdiction,"
see Cox, supra note 42, at 1507-18.
45. Smith & Jones, The Impact of the Emerging Federal Law of Grievance Arbitration
on Judges, Arbitrators, and Parties, 52 VA. L. REV. 831, 832 (1966). At the outset it must
be noted that there is a strong presumption in favor of arbitrability, fostered initially by the
1960 "Steelworker's Trilogy" (United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); and United
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of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."4 The broadest
clauses allow arbitration of contract interpretation differences and of
any local dispute between the parties. 7 A more commonly used
clause limits arbitration to disputes concerning the terms of the
agreement.4" Other clauses designate specific issues as arbitrable49 or
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)), nurtured by voluminous
literature thereafter, modified and elucidated by the 1962 cases (Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson
[Sinclair I], 370 U.S. 195 (1962); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co. [Sinclair II], 370 U.S. 238
(1962); and Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962)), and
expanded by the 1964 cases (Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964), and John
Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964)). A major step was taken in 1970 when the
Supreme Court overruled Sinclair I and held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act's absolute prohibi-
tion of labor injunctions must be reconciled with the developing use and value of the arbitral
process and that where an issue was arbitrable under a contract, a contractual no-strike clause
could be enforced injunctively. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 250 (1970).
46. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960). For an
extensive survey of the Trilogy's effect on courts' decisions enforcing arbitration, see Smith &
Jones, supra note 45, at 838-66.
47. The arbitration clause in the contract between the United Steelworkers and Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co. was interpreted to allow the matter to be arbitrated at least to determine
whether the disputed matter was solvable by arbitration. In the subsequent arbitration, it
was decided that the matter was arbitrable. Warrior & Gulf, 36 Lab. Arb. 695 (1961) (Holly,
Arbitrator). The clause provided:
Issues which conflict with any Federal statute in its application as established by Court
procedure or matters which are strictly a function of management shall not be subject
to arbitration under this section.
Should differences arise between the Company and the Union or its members em-
ployed by the Company as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this
Agreement, or should any local trouble of any kind arise, there shall be no suspension
of work on account of such differences but an earnest effort shall be made to settle such
differences immediately in the following manner:
Fifth, if agreement has not been reached the matter shall be referred to an impartial
umpire for decision. 363 U.S. 574, 576 (1960).
A clause with perhaps even broader scope is illustrated by the following:
[A]ny dispute involving the interpretation, application or alleged violation of any provi-
sion of this Agreement, or any alleged action of the Company or its supervisors which
the employee feels unjustly or unlawfully affects his job or any benefits arising out of
his job [will be arbitrated]. Pacific Power & Light Co., and Pacific Power Council of
the Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, I CCH LAB. L. REP., UNION CONTRACTS ARBITRATION
59,928 at 6.0-7.0.
48. Any disputes, misunderstandings, differences or grievances arising between the par-
ties as to the meaning, interpretation and application of the provisions of this agreement
• . . may be submitted to the Board of Arbitration for decision . ...
The arbitrator may interpret this agreement and apply it to the particular case under
consideration but shall, however, have no authority to add to, subtract from, or modify
the terms of the agreement. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,
565 n.1 (1960).
49. Any controversy which has not been satisfactorily adjusted under the Grievance
Procedure and which involves. A. The discharge of an Employee or B. The interpretation
of provisions of this contract or C. An alleged violation of the contract may be submitted
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exclude from general arbitrability a particular subject, such as shift
transfers" or new job rates.51 Under the broad standards of arbitrabil-
ity enunciated in 1960 by the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers
Trilogy,52 there would be judicially enforceable (threshold) arbitrabil-
ity"3 of most issues if either the broad clause or the more common,
limited clause were used.54 Even if the matter sought to be changed
is not clearly controlled by the contract, the question of whether the
contract allowed a party unilateral control over the matter in dispute
would arguably be arbitrable.55
The presumption -of arbitrability arising from judicial predilec-
tions toward encouraging industrial self-government is, however,
not irrebuttable. In instances where clauses expressly exclude matters
from arbitration, courts will frequently deny threshold arbitrabil-
ity.5 1 Moreover, even if threshold arbitrability is found by the
to the Arbitration Committee. . . . Union Carbide Corp., Nuclear Div. and Atomic
Trades and Labor Council; contract expiring June, 1972, reported in BNA, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING-NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 51:263 (1972).
50. Shift assignments are made by the Company in accordance with production require-
ments. Both the Company and the Union recognize that some employees . . . may
desire transfer to another shift. . . . The shift change shall be made as openings occur
and production requirements permit and, where possible, in the order that the requests
are received by the department. Grievances filed under this Section of the Agreement
shall be subject to the Grievance Procedure up to but not including Step Four, Arbitra-
tion. General Dynamics Corp., Convair Div. and Machinists; contract expiring March,
1972, reported in BNA, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS
51:265 (1972).
5 1. When the Company adds a new job to the bargaining unit it will determine the base
rate and notify the Union. If the Union disagrees with the base rate determined by the
Company, it may institute a grievance. . . in the Third Step of the Grievance Procedure
.... If no agreement is reached, the grievance may be referred to the regular Fourth
Step of the Grievance Procedure but may not be arbitrated. Campbell Soup Co. and
Meat Cutters; contract expiring March, 1972, reported in BNA, COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING-NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 51:264 (1972).
52. See note 45 supra.
53. See note 44 supra.
54. See note 45 supra.
55. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Teamsters Local 866, 447 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1971);
Local 198, Rubber Workers v. Interco Inc., 415 F.2d 1208, 1211 (8th Cir. 1969); Local 24,
IBEW v. Hearst Corp., 352 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 937 (1966); Local
1987, IBEW v. Control Prod. Co., 330 F. Supp. 250 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Dean Truck Line, Inc.
v. Teamsters Local 667, 327 F. Supp. 1335, 1340 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Smith & Jones, supra
note 45, at 858-60.
56. NLRB v. Community Motor Bus Co., 439 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1971) (employer had
expressly reserved the right to refuse to hire employees guilty of illegal picketing activity, thus
there was no duty to arbitrate grievances on the matter); Halstead & Mitchell Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 421 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1969) (if the mafiagement rights clause is specific in
giving the employer unilateral control to determine layoffs, and the arbitration clause excludes
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court, the arbitrator himself may decide that the contract does not
authorize his arbitral jurisdiction over the disputed matter." When
either the courts or arbitrators find a matter unarbitrable, the parties
are left to determine their rights within the previously outlined statu-
tory and case-law guidelines for mid-term modification conduct."
If the breadth of the arbitration clause renders the subject matter
of the mid-term modification arbitrable, the authorized scope of the
arbitrator's award must be determined. The proper scope of the
award will be controlled largely by the wording of the arbitration
clause, 9 the bargaining history between the parties, 0 and the enforce-
able scope of the management rights clause.' Most frequently, the
arbitrator will restrict his award to deciding the manner in which
labor and management intended to deal between themselves with
respect to the subject matter of the modification-through mutual
from its scope matter covered by the management rights clause, there is no duty to arbitrate);
General Tel. Co. v. C.W.A., 402 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1968) (grievant, a supervisor, was not an
employee within the unit whose grievances employer had decided to arbitrate); Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co. v. C.W.A., 324 F. Supp. 830 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (union was not bound to arbitrate
its complaint over a mid-term modification because the clause expressly excluded the matter
from its scope).
57. See Western Elec. Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 1018, 1021 (1966) (Dugan, Arbitrator) (the stan-
dard for courts to follow in enforcing arbitration clauses does not apply to the arbitrator);
Master Builder's Ass'n of W. Pa., Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 892, 893-94 (1965) (McDermott, Arbitra-
tor); Warrior & Gulf, 36 Lab. Arb. 695, 696 (1961) (Holly, Arbitrator) ("the Supreme Court
. . . left the basic question of arbitrability for the Arbitrator to decide"); Smith & Jones, supra
note 45, at 873. For an analysis of contractual bases upon which arbitrators may rely in refusing
jurisdiction, see id. at 866-85. See also Cox, supra note 42, at 1507-18.
58. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. C.W.A., 324 F. Supp. 830 (S.D. Tex. 1971), illustrates
the dangers inherent in such a situation. In Southwestern, the employer unilaterally instituted
a mid-term modification of scheduling and seniority which was not within the terms of the
contract. The union went on strike in protest, in spite of a no-strike clause. The employer
attempted to obtain a Boys Markets' injunction to enjoin a breach of the no-strike clabse, but
its motion was denied since the matter was not arbitrable within the parties' contract. Thus,
there was no trade-off of arbitration for the no-strike pledge.
59. For instance, in Hughes Tool Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1125 (1960) (Aarron, Arbitrator), the
arbitration clause provided: "the arbiters shall not add to, subtract from, change or modify any
provision of this agreement," and the arbitrator deemed this controlling on his ability to provide
a solution to the dispute.
60. See Plumbing-Heating & Piping Council, 54 Lab. Arb. 478,483 (1970) (Eaton, Arbitra-
tor); Bell Tel. Labs., 39 Lab. Arb. 1191, 1205 (1962) (Roberts, Arbitrator) (bargaining history
is a proper means of determining what was meant to be subject to arbitration when the parties
contend that the contract can be interpreted in opposite ways).
61. See notes 35-39 supra and accompanying text. For instance, in R. H. Macy & Co., 69-
I CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 8126 (1968) (Epstein, Arbitrator), management's prerogatives
were held to allow unilateral action.
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consent,2 bargaining, 3 or unilateral control. 4 On the other hand, the
parties may allow the arbitrator to engage in "interest arbitration"
and decide the substance of the matter himself. 5 "Interest arbitra-
tion" is not frequently authorized by collective bargaining agree-
ments. Accordingly, the standard clause providing that "the arbitra-
tor shall not have power to add to nor subtract from the terms of the
Agreement" 6 would negatively decide the question of whether the
62. See International Shoe Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 752 (1966) (Hilpert, Arbitrator); Keystone-
Steel and Wire Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 648 (1965) (Daugherty, Arbitrator) (the provision that
changes in the standard work force be "agreed upon in negotiations" was held to preclude the
employer's mid-term unilateral reduction in the work force). A requirement of mutual consent
also encompasses an interpretation that the contract forecloses the matter from any change
since the contract may always be changed with the parties' mutual consent.
63. Samuel M. Gertman Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 30, 33 (1965) (Kennedy, Arbitrator) (the con-
tract cannot be interpreted to disallow the modification if there is full and open bargaining);
Hughes Tool Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1125, 1128-29 (1960) (Aarron, Arbitrator) (the contract con-
tained a wage reopener for "negotiation," a broad no-strike clause, and an arbitration clause
which did not allow addition to or subtraction from the terms of the contract. The arbitrator
held that the parties only intended that there be negotiation, and although impasse resulted and
the contract forbade a strike, the parties intended that this be the result).
64. See, e.g., Consol. Foods Corp., 47 Lab. Arb. 1162 (1967) (Kelliher, Arbitrator); Can-
non Elec. Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 481 (1965) (Kotin, Arbitrator); Western Greyhound Lines, 33 Lab.
Arb. 157 (1959) (Kleinsorge, Arbitrator) (the arbitrator determined that the unilateral
discontinuation of providing uniforms for drivers was arbitrable since the contract provided for
continuance of agreed-upon practices and arbitration disputes of contract interpretation. He
found, however, that the employer had unilateral control over the matter); Cramer Posture
Chair Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 283 (1958) (Beatty, Arbitrator).
65. See, e.g., M.K. & 0. Transit Lines, Inc. v. Div. No. 892, 319 F.2d 488, 490 (10th Cir.
1963) (if the union had not terminated the contract, it was evident that the parties had agreed
to arbitrate the union demands upon bargaining impasse); Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 43 Lab.
Arb. 758, 761-62 (1964) (King, Arbitrator) (arbitrator found authorization to engage in interest
arbitration, but declined to do so); Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 845, 848 (1947)
(McCoy, Arbitrator) (after determining that the parties wished the arbitration panel to ascer-
tain the terms of the contract, the panel was bound to act as the parties would have reasonably
done).
Unions and management in the United States have traditionally shunned "interest arbitra-
tion," and less than 2% of the major collective bargaining agreements provide for any arbitra-
tion of terms of a new agreement. A. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & D. ROTHSCHILD, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING & LABOR ARBITRATION 104 (1970).
66. Ranco, Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. 269, 273 (1968) (Klien, Arbitrator); Pittsburgh-Des Moines
Steel Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 577, 581 (1963) (Koven, Arbitrator) (the company made out a credible
story that the contract was misdrafted to allow pay for holidays falling on Saturday. The
arbitrator held, however, that revision of the contract was beyond his authority since the
contract forbade alteration or amendment of the contract); Hughes Tool Co., 36 Lab. Arb.
1125, 1128 (1960) (Aarron, Arbitrator) (the arbitrator held that the mandate neither to add
to, nor subtract from, the contract's terms precluded establishment of wage rates after a
bargaining impasse on reopening. Since the contract only provided for "negotiation" and since
arbitration to set rates was uncommon in the industry, not even the presence of a no-strike
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arbitrator should himself determine the merits and content of the
proposed change and thus preclude "interest arbitration."
The development of an indigenous system of dispute resolution in
industrial relations by means of arbitration gives rise to a potential
disparity between, on the one hand, arbitral decisions and, on the
other hand, NLRB and judicial positions. For example, with respect
to the question of how the parties meant to deal between themselves
in relation to the matter to be modified, the arbitrator's decision
might be assumed to parallel the Board's decisions holding that either
the mutual consent or bargaining provisions of section 8(d) are ap-
plicable. However, the cases indicate that the arbitrator will not nec-
essarily use the contractual interpretation standards employed by the
Board. Arbitrators tend to weigh more heavily than does the Board
the parties' bargaining history and may attempt to determine the true
contractual intent of the parties."7 A more significant difference, how-
ever, is the standard which will be used to find that either a waiver
of bargaining rights has taken place or that, conversely, mutual con-
sent is required. Failure to interpret collective agreements as requir-
ing the parties to bargain will render arbitrators' standards different
from those of the Board since, as has been shown, the Board does
not hesitate to interpret bargaining agreements as requiring bargain-
ing to impasse or agreement."' However, the fact that the parties have
chosen to bring the dispute within the jurisdiction of an arbitrator
may indicate their desire to substitute his judgment for the risk of
bargaining to impasse. Arbitration decisions bear out this implicit
preference, since looser standards than those used by the Board are
employed to find either that one party has unilateral control or that
mutual consent is required; those decisions leaving the parties to
resolve their differences through bargaining are few. "
One line of arbitration cases illustrates a willingness to find uni-
lateral control by one of the parties. In C.G. Bretting Manufacturing
Co.,70 for example, the employer, without bargaining, transferred
clause in this post-Trilogy arbitration would force the interpretation that there should be
arbitration after impasse). On the other hand, in Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 43 Lab. Arb. 758,
761 (1964) (King, Arbitrator), the arbitrator felt that the absence of the "no addition" clause
allowed him the power to add to the contract, although he declined to do so.
67. See Cox, supra note 42, at 1493-1500. See also cases cited supra at note 60.
68. See notes 19-41 supra and accompanying text.
69. See note 63 supra.
70. 70-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 8167 (1969) (Solomon, Arbitrator). For similar arbi-
trators' holdings, apparently applying different waiver standards than those indicated by the
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certain employees from one shift to another. The union contended
that, although seniority rights as to shifts were not specified in the
contract, the parties intended that management would be precluded
from altering practices in shift changes without bargaining. Adhering
to a residual rights theory, the arbitrator held that the employer
retained the right to manage the business except as specifically lim-
ited by the collective agreement and determined that management's
unilateral action was justified under the contract. Manifestly, the
Board would not have reached this result absent clear contractual or
bargaining history waiver." It is therefore apparent that arbitrators72
can employ standards to interpret the intent of the parties different
from those utilized by the Board.
In another line of cases, arbitrators appear to strain in their ef-
forts to find the necessity for mutual consent. 7 For instance, in
Sohio Chemical Co.,74 the employer approved an exchange of jobs by
two employees. When the appyoval was challenged by the union as a
breach of contract, the employer contended that no specific con-
tractual clause was controlling. Without specifically finding a con-
tract violation, the arbitrator determined that the action violated the
"spirit" of the agreement and held that mutual consent was required
to give the employer power to approve such exchanges. Consequently,
a determination was made by the arbitrator consistent with that
which would likely be reached by the Board in the same factual
situation.
In sum, the introduction of an arbitral solution to a mid-term
modification dispute may preclude the necessity of bargaining to
impasse and may thereby avoid subsequent initiation of a change in
terms and conditions of employment. Since arbitration is viewed as
a substitute for bargaining,75 the arbitrator will likely employ con-
tract interpretation standards which either allow unilateral control or
require mutual consent.
Board and the courts, see Owens-Illinois, Inc., 70-2 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 8606 (1970)
(Stouffer, Arbitrator); Lone Star Brewing Co., 53 Lab. Arb. 1317 (1969) (Autrey, Arbitrator);
Stewart-Warner Corp., 33 Lab. Arb. 816 (1960) (Uible, Arbitrator).
71. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
72. See cases cited supra at note 70.
73. Sohio Chem. Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 624 (1965) (Witney, Arbitrator); Atlanta Newspapers,
Inc., 43 Lab. Arb. 758, 761 (1964) (King, Arbitrator). See also International Shoe Co., 46 Lab.
Arb. 752 (1966) (Hilpert, Arbitrator); Yale & Towne, Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 923 (1965) (Seiden-
berg, Arbitrator); United Banking Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 337 (1964) (Kreimer, Arbitrator).
74. 44 Lab. Arb. 624 (1965) (Witney, Arbitrator).
75. See generally Cushman, supra note 43.
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Collyer Insulated Wire: AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR ARBITRATION OF
MID-TERM MODIFICATION DISPUTES
When mid-term modifications are effected unilaterally by an
employer, it is usually after afait accompli that management's coun-
sel has the opportunity to fit the conduct into some legal rationale.
Under these circumstances, problems may arise when an employer,
after taking unilateral modifying action, faces an unfair labor prac-
tice charge and contends that the union's grievance over the modifica-
tion is a matter for arbitration rather than for Board proceedings.
This is a much litigated situation,6 and a recent Board decision7 has
considerably changed the previously unfavorable position of manage-
ment in these circumstances.
The employer usually defends against a refusal to bargain charge
by claiming contractual authority for his actions.78 However, as has
been indicated, waiver of bargaining rights requires such specificity
that to succeed in this defense an employer must show union accept-
ance of an appropriate, explicit clause in the collective agreement.
The second line of defense is a claim that the arbitration clause
requires the union to arbitrate the matter as one involving a dispute
related to interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Until
recently, however, this argument was accepted only in unusual cir-
cumstances. 79
76. See, e.g.. 'Consol. Foods Corp., 183 N.L.R.B. No. 78, 74 L.R.R.M. 1374 (1970)
(compare majority opinion with concurring opinion); Macy's Calif., 183 N.L.R.B. No. 47, 74
L.R.R.M. 1305 (1970) (compare majority opinion with dissent); Combined Paper Mills, Inc.,
174 N.L.R.B. No. 71, 70 L.R.R.M. 1209 (1969); Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B.
No. 23, 70 L.R.R.M. 1472 (1968); Flintkote Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1561 (1964); LeRoy Mach.
Co., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964); Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410
(1964); Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1963).
77. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
78. See, e.g., Unit Drop Forge, Div., Eaton Yale & Towne, 171 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 68
L.R.R.M. 1129 (1968); Scam Inst. Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. 284, 287 (1967), enforced, 394 F.2d
884 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 393 U.S. 980 (1968); C & C Plywood Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 414
(1964); LeRoy Mach. Co., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964).
79. Flintkote Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1561, 1562 (1964); Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 143 N.L.R.B.
1311, 1312 (1963); Montgomery Ward & Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 418, 423 (1962). NLRB General
Counsel Nash stated that the Board's pre-Collyer position was to defer in cases where there
had been or would be actual resort to the arbitral process as distinguished from failure to
voluntarily resort thereto when the process was available. Address by General Counsel Nash,
FMCS-AAA Regional Conference on Labor Arbitration, Buffalo, N.Y., October 15, 1971,
reported in 78 BNA LAB. REL. REP. 159 (1971). The pre-Collyer position is illustrated by two
Board decisions. In Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 70 L.R.R.M. 1472
(1968), the employer, with substantial contractual authority, unilaterally discontinued provid-
ing a "relief man" to operate equipment while "regulars" were on break. Rather than passing
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However, the Board recently reversed its previous consistent re-
luctance to defer to arbitration in circumstances involving an unfair
labor practice charge and, in Collyer Insulated Wire,"0 held that
under certain circumstances it would defer to arbitration of a matter
which was alleged to be both a breach of contract and an unfair labor
practice."' In Collyer, the employer unilaterally granted skilled main-
tenance personnel wage increases, an action which arguably was per-
missible under the terms of the collective agreement. The union
claimed that the unilateral action was not contractually authorized
since the employer had attempted to obtain these changes during
contract negotiations, but had been refused by the union unless plant-
wide wage hikes were granted. The Board held that the matter could
be resolved by contract interpretation pursuant to the bargained-for
settlement procedures, even though the action constituted a possible
refusal to bargain in violation of section 8(a)(5).8 2 The Board found
that "this dispute in its entirety arises from the contract between the
parties and from the parties' relationship under the contract
. ,,8 Since "the parties have contractually committed them-
selves to mutually agreeable procedures for resolving their disputes"84
and because these procedures "made available a quick and fair means
for the resolution of this dispute,"85 the Board should defer to arbitra-
tion.
on the union's unfair labor practice charge, the Board deferred to arbitration since the employer
had not taken the action to undermine the union and had acted with substantial contractual
justification. Further, the Board noted that the arbitration clause appeared to encompass the
dispute and would allow solution in accordance with the Act.
The more typical Board reaction to an employer's invocation of the arbitration clause after
effecting a mid-term modification is illustrated by Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., 147
N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964). In Cloverleaf. the employer unilaterally reassigned customers of its
driver-salesmen, thereby effecting an admitted change in conditions of employment contained
in the contract. The Board rejected the employer's defense that the union was required to resort
to binding arbitration and held that, even if the matter were arbitrable, the employer had clearly
committed a section 8(a)(5) violation by acting unilaterally with respect to a mandatory subject
of bargaining rights. Id. at 1415. Cloverleaf illustrates two important points: first, action before
either bargaining or arbitration constitutes a section 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain unless bargaining
rights have been waived; second, action followed by invocation of arbitration does not fulfill
the employer's statutory duty to bargain.
80. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
81. Id., 77 L.R.R.M. at 1936. For a considerably more informal analysis of the anticipated
impact of Collyer on the adjudication of disputes, see Address of NLRB Chairman E.B. Miller,
Conference of Western States Employers Ass'n Executives, Pebble Beach, Cal., Aug. 27, 1971,
reported in 78 BNA LAB. REL. REP. 28 (1971).
82. 77 L.R.R.M. at 1935-38.
83. Id. at 1934.
84. Id. at 1937.
85. Id. at 1934.
Vol. 1972:8131
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
The impact of Collyer upon mid-term modifications is far-
reaching. The decision indicates that whenever the desired mid-term
modification is based upon contractual authority which clearly raises
an arbitrable issue of contract interpretation,"6 the Board will be
amenable to deferral even though unilateral action, possibly in viola-
tion of section 8(a)(5), has already occurred.
The advantages of the decision are quite obvious. If the parties
had intended that a matter be submitted to arbitration, initiation of
an unfair labor practice charge by one party only prolongs the dis-
pute. Moreover, even after deciding that an unfair labor practice has
been committed, the Board will usually only order the employer to
rescind the unilateral action and to bargain before proceeding fur-
ther." Thus, the matter will still be remanded to carry out the arbitra-
tion or bargaining processes which perhaps already would have re-
solved the parties' dispute.
On the other hand, submission of the matter to an arbitrator may
not always fulfill the purposes of the Act as interpreted by the Board.
In theory, the arbitrator is bound by the collective agreement, rather
than by the Act and interpretive case law. Thus, without applying the
same rigid standards governing waiver used by the Board, the arbitra-
tor may well find that the union waived its right to bargain on a
matter. As previously discussed,88 in order to preclude the dangers of
mid-term bargaining to impasse, the arbitrator may strain to find
either contractual authority for bargaining waiver, and consequent
unilateral control, or the requirement for mutual consent before
change.
As the Board has made clear, and as the NLRB General Counsel
has also pointed out, 9 there are effective qualifications on the "Col-
lyerability"90 of unilateral action which is both arbitrable and a possi-
ble unfair labor practice: the contractual basis for the action must
have been substantial; the arbitral procedure must be adequate to
resolve the unfair labor practice charge and contract interpretation
dispute in consonance with the Act; there must be evidence of a
relationship between the parties conducive to arbitral resolution of
86. The Board emphasizes that the dispute must be over a good-faith contract interpreta-
tion-"the very stuff of labor contract arbitration." Id. at 1936-37.
87. See cases cited supra at hote 18.
88. See notes 68-74 supra and accompanying text.
89. Address of General Counsel Nash, supra note 79, at 161.
90. Id. at 165.
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problems;"' the procedures must conform to standards established by
the Board in Spielberg Mfg. Co. ;9 and the Board will retain jurisdic-
tion for the limited purpose of entertaining a motion from a party
complaining that the purposes of the Act have been offended by the
arbitration."'
Despite these assurances, however, unless the Board closely po-
lices the standards by which arbitrators allow bargaining waivers,
there will likely be both a Board standard and arbitrators' standards
for the allowance of unilateral mid-term modification. 4 Since the
parties have agreed to submit their grievances to binding arbitration,
a double standard or possible departure from the statutory standard
may be justified by the benefits of industrial self-government. Never-
theless, as the dissent in Collyer points out, the parties are henceforth
precluded from exercising the previously available choice between the
strict statutory/case-law bargaining waiver standards and the less
predictable arbitration standards. 5 Furthermore, by allowing man-
agement to take action prior to arbitration, Collyer contravenes a
definite policy against unilateral action. Realizing this, an employer
may be likely to proceed in cases where an argument of contractual
justification for the unilateral action can reasonably be made. Al-
though the standards stated by the Board for the use of Collyer
assume good faith use of the arbitral process,97 there may be a tend-
ency to allow the class of "Collyerable" cases to expand in order to
ease the Board's caseload pressure.9
Thus, when a union challenges an employer's right to make uni-
lateral changes, the employer will not be subject to the threat of an
unfair labor practice charge if he is willing to arbitrate the matter.
Oddly enough, while the trend of Board and court decisions has
91. 77 L.R.R.M. at 1936.
92. Id. at 1937.
IT]he proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be
bound, and the decision of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes
and policies of the Act. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
93. 77 L.R.R.M. at 1938.
94. See notes 68-74 supra and accompanying text.
95. 77 L.R.R.M. at 1940-44.
96. See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
97. 77 L.R.R.M. at 1936.
98. Address of Chairman Miller, supra note 81. Chairman Miller points to the caseload
backlog as one of the major problems plaguing the national labor policy and discusses Collyer
as a possible means of shifting the burden of labor regulation from the Board to industrial self-
government.
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required either bargaining before action or drafting specific clauses
to meet anticipated need, the Collyer approach may encourage par-
ties to act first and await possible reaction.
SUMMARY
Action without prior consultation with the other party-by either
bargaining or arbitration-is rarely proper under the Act. Nonethe-
less, absent contradictory contractual provisions and modifications
affecting a term of employment contained in the contract, the legal
ability of the employer to make mid-term modifications after bar-
gaining to impasse clearly exists. The effect of arbitration clauses on
this ability is highly significant. On the one hand, these provisions can
be a hindrance, since the arbitrator may find that either the modifica-
tion was intended by the parties to be accomplished with mutual
consent or that he must decide on the content of the modification.
However, in view of possible adverse union reaction to unilateral
action after impasse,99 the employer may be well-advised to resort to
the arbitrator rather than incur his employees' wrath by effecting a
modification of working conditions during the term of a contract.
The new development reflected by Collyer quite possibly gives the
employer more latitude by allowing him to make the change first and
arbitrate later if the union objects. While Collyer subjects
management's new latitude to the Board's ultimate review of the
arbitral decision, the precise boundaries of this limitation are not yet
clear.
99. See note 58 supra.
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